Tuesday, November 22, 2011

Ashes at Dawn: 10 Reasons why the Trojan War was Unjust

“NO! This is unjust! I won’t have it!” She screamed. Grabbing her forcefully by the arms, the men dragged her on to the ship which would take the helpless young woman back to the foreign and dreaded city of Troy. Suddenly she was thrust into an unfamiliar, though richly decorated chamber. Sensing someone else’s presence in the room with her, Helen turned around. Then she stood there, as still and cold as ice. It was Paris.

For centuries, people have sought to understand conflict, the human struggle for conquest, and ultimately, war, in all its complexity. Every civilization has a need to comprehend the mortal endeavor for triumph and equity. What is war? Why does it exist? Most importantly, is any given war just? The last of these three is the question this essay shall seek to answer in the context of the Trojan War, which occurred sometime between 1334 BC and 1180 BC.1  In this work, the standard of criteria the author will hold to for a just war is found in the Just War Theory. On this rationale, there are ten valid reasons that demonstrate how the Trojan War was unnecessary and unjust.

All argumentation must be founded on reason. Without a sound basis, an argument is irrelevant. As a result, a brief explanation of the authors of and key ideas in the Just War Theory is necessary to this discussion. In the secular world, the Just War Theory dates as far back as the ancient Roman philosopher Cicero. In his work, De Officiis, Cicero began to lay a foundation for the theory by stating, “The only excuse, therefore, for going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed; and when the victory is won, we should spare those who have not been blood-thirsty and barbarous in their warfare.”2 By this, Cicero instituted the principle of becoming involved in war solely for the achievement of peace, as well as the ideal of not harming innocent civilians in the process of warfare. Fast-forward a few hundred years, and one will come across a man named Augustine. A fellow proponent of just wars, Augustine stated in his City of God that, “A just war, moreover, is justified only by the injustice of an aggressor; and that injustice ought to be a source of grief to any good man, because it is human injustice. It would be deplorable in itself, apart from being a source of conflict.”3 In making this statement, Augustine was clearly arguing that war should only be a possibility when something truly unjust and abominable has occurred. Even in that case, he would make the argument that it should distress the human heart deeper than just to the point of anger. In other words, war, according to St. Augustine, really ought to be deeply felt and gravely needed before it takes place. Let several centuries pass, and the final link in the history of the Just War Theory is making his case. St. Thomas Aquinas, an Italian priest and theologian, in his Summa Theologica, addresses the question of war as always evil. In response to this issue, before affirming the points already founded by Cicero and Augustine, Aquinas adds, “I answer that, in order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior.”4  A legitimate authority, according to Aquinas, must be the one to wage war. He goes on to confirm Cicero and Augustine’s points as true, biblical, and valid. By the work of the remarkable trio that is found in Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas, we are presented with the three most fundamental points in the Just War Theory: 1) that war must be a means to the end that is peace, and must not violate the rights of innocent civilians; 2) that there must be a valid cause for the war, and 3) that a legitimate authority must declare the warfare. Rearranged, these points begin to loosely form the three aspects of what has become known as the Just War Theory: Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello, and Jus post Bellum.

The contemporary reader will be quick to wonder what is meant by these Latin terms. When translated to English, they read: “Right to the war,” “Right in the war,” and “Right after the war.” These three categories answer the question of what is a just cause for waging war and who can declare it; what are the proper ways to conduct a war; and what is a legitimate reason to end a war, as well as how it should be ended. Let these three points be examined. First, jus ad bellum. This is the most important and fundamental issue in all the just war theory, because the beginning will usually set the tone for everything else. Essentially, jus ad bellum is constituted of: a just cause, comparative justice, competent authority, right intention, probability of success, last resort, and proportionality.56 These terms being somewhat ambiguous, allow some definitions to be provided.
Just cause requires that an innocent person’s life be at stake before war ensues.
Comparative justice demands that one party be much more greatly injured than the other party. Competent authority states that a legitimate ruler must declare the war.
Right intention insists that the only aim of a war is to deal with the issue at hand, and not to win territory.
Probability of success asks that the war be reasonable in the measures it is likely to use for its cause.
Last resort makes it clear that a war is only just when all peaceful means of resolution have been first sought out.
Proportionality, finally, says that the amount of harm must be equal to or less than the amount of good accomplished in the war.
All these are requirements that a war must meet before it even begins, in order for it to be a truly just war.

The second aspect of a just war is jus in bello. This part of the Just War Theory deals with what happens during the proceedings of the war. As a continuation of jus ad bellum, many of the components of jus in bello closely resemble the components of jus ad bellum. Jus in bello is defined by: distinction, proportionality, military necessity, fair treatment of prisoners of war, and no means mala in se. Again, some clarification is necessary.
Distinction is that property of just war which ensures that only combatants are battle targets, rather than civilians.
Proportionality deals with the question of how many civilian lives taken in battle are too many, relative the size of the problem.
Military necessity sets forward that minimalistic force should be used in battle.
Fair treatment of POWs reminds the militant that once someone is a prisoner, he is no longer a threat, and should not be maltreated.
The final point of jus in bello, no means mala in se, prohibits weapons or tactics of mass destruction or unnecessary evil.

Lastly to be considered in the Just War Theory is jus post bellum, which lays out guidelines for properly ending a war. The five points that build this concluding argument are: just cause for termination, right intention, public declaration and authority, discrimination, and proportionality.  As previously, allow clarifying definitions to be placed.
Just cause for termination is based on a thorough agreement of surrender of the party in the wrong.
Right intention, as it explains by itself, is that requirement of just war which states that war may not be ended for revenge, or to avoid dealing with recompense for wrongs in war.
Public declaration and authority says that an official must publicly declare the war as ended.
Discrimination requires discernment in seeing who is free to go, and who needs further punishment as part of the settlement.
Proportionality ensures that if any terms of surrender are agreed upon, they must be proportionate relative the size of the original problem.
These seventeen laws of war are the components of The Just War Theory as we now know it. Categorized into three groups, jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum, they provide a thorough review of how a war ought to be justly brought into existence, justly fought through, and justly concluded. With this foundation now given in full, it is natural to continue by applying these principles to an actual war. The war in question is, as was previously stated, the Trojan War, and will be analyzed in a very slow-motion, step-by-step process, starting right at the beginning.

Several women stood in the wharf at Argos, buying everything that they wished to take back to their families. “Io,” said a friend of the king’s daughter, “look! Foreign men! Handsome, wouldn’t you say?” Playfully, the girl winked at Io. Hearing the eagerness in her companion’s voice, Io turned. Then, before she could understand what was happening, someone rushed at all the females in their company, and they were being carried onto some Phenician ship they had never seen before. Crying aloud among these “handsome men,” the women clung to one another as they were treacherously taken to Egypt. This, of course, is the way in which Herodotus, in his Histories, describes the origins of the Trojan War. It was Troy’s fault, he says. There is no need to question him. What comes next, though, catches the reader by surprise. He continues his story with the famous rape of Europa as the Greek revenge for Io. Not stopping there, though, it seems that the Greeks rather liked this woman-stealing business, and so “After this however the Hellenes they say, were the authors of the second wrong; for they sailed into Aia of Colchis...[and] they carried off the king’s daughter Medea.”7 After this, Medea’s father came to demand her back. Responding, the Greeks simply said, “You didn’t pay us back for Io. Deal with it.” Of course, this angered the king, but for the time, there was nothing he could do but wait.

Many people are quick to accuse the Trojans of starting the Trojan War. Several reasons are behind this. Namely, the Trojans didn’t last, it is called the Trojan War, and that’s just the way the story goes. They started it. While this is theoretically true, a look at the narrative just given indicates that the Greeks may have had more involvement in it than people think. Up to this point in the conflict, the Trojans have abducted one woman, and the Greeks have abducted two. Knowing what happens next, it is correct to say that in the end both parties abducted two women. If this is the truth, there is something wrong in the picture. According to jus ad bellum, the wrong on one side must greatly outweigh the wrong done on the opposing side, in order for a war to be just. This is what was previously defined as comparative justice. If the reasons given above really caused the Trojan War, then the very first thing the Greeks did in declaring war was to act in denial of comparative justice! This means that they were really starting the war off in a bad direction. In this denial of dignity, the first reason the Trojan War was unjust is established. Both sides of the issue were completely wrong in what they did: neither was justified. Yet war was not justified, either. The Bible, which is the supreme authority under God, says in Psalm 55:20-21, “My companion stretched out his hand against his friends; he violated his covenant. His speech was smooth as butter, yet war was in his heart; his words were softer than oil, yet they were drawn swords.”8  Like the Greeks who refused the king of Colchis his daughter, so the Bible speaks of men whose speech is smooth, but who hold evil around every corner. The problem these men had was in their hearts, where war comes from. In other words, sin didn’t just cause the Trojan War, sin started the Trojan War. Usually, that’s not the best foundation for battle.

As a little boy, Paris had heard the many stories of the abductions that had happened several years prior his birth. Everyone knew these tales. Some were frustrated by them, while others were thrilled to hear interesting accounts like these. Paris placed himself as neutral when he was young. As he grew up, though, Paris began to find he rather liked beautiful women. Maybe if the opportunity arose, he would take advantage of it. Then, one day, while visiting Mycenaean Sparta on business, he saw her. Helen was gorgeous, and wholly captivated him. Her husband was gone at a funeral. In a sudden rush to leave the city, Paris whispered something to one of his servants. Nodding reluctantly, the two men split their ways. As this interaction between prince and attendant had been taking place, the young queen of Sparta was a little farther down the shore, enjoying the cool of the waves in the summer heat. As the manservant came walking along with a companion, Helen turned. “Is someone in need of me?” she asked. Without an answer, the two men took her by force and carried her off toward the ship where she would find Paris waiting for her. At first she found this very unjust and highly undesirable. As time elapsed, though, she became more open to this adulterous abduction. In the meantime, Helen’s husband Menelaos was boiling over in fury, and was relentlessly determined to show his anger to the world. His anger, in fact, became the topic of choice in Homer’s Iliad, and was the ultimate direct cause of the Trojan War.

“Aggression thus attacks the very spine of human civilization itself,” writes one political philosopher.9 Indeed, this is a very true and important statement that must be acknowledged and carefully considered when one looks at the Trojan War. Aggression and violence are not proponents of society, yet this is precisely the cause of the war in question. The Iliad begins with the statement, “Sing, goddess, the anger of Peleus’ son Achilleus and its devastation.”10 Right off the bat, anger is a real issue for the Greeks and Trojans. As the book unfolds, it continues to reveal anger coming out of many of the characters. Anger was the driving force behind the Trojan War. As the reader may recall, however, Augustine stated that war should be caused by injustice that hurts and penetrates the human heart to the point where people want to set it right for whoever was done injustice, not for vengeance or personal gain. This is the aspect of Just War Theory which is called “just cause,” which requires that an innocent person’s life be at stake before war is declared, and that aggression is not the driving point of such war. Seeing how anger is the theme of the Iliad, however, one can safely conclude that this is the second way in which the Just War Theory was violated in the Trojan War.

Let two perspectives on the Trojan War be examined: that of the Trojans and of the Greeks. First, the Trojan position shall be set forward. There is no historical record indicating that the Greeks attempted peace. Yet, if they had set forward some such request,  they would all be meaningless to Paris. He had won Helen, and if Menelaos wanted to use force, that was what he would have to do to get the girl back. Paris’ father, though disgraced and frustrated, was not concerned either. This was his son’s choice, and he would let him deal with it. To the Trojan royalty, the issue of war or peace was of no consequence. The Trojan people, however, may have disagreed and looked down upon this decision to not try to return Helen. While there is no specific evidence for such an argument, one can assert that as many of the Trojan advisors were encouraging of returning Helen, many of the people were probably on this side as well. From the Greek perspective, the king is the key player. Throughout much of the early ancient period, kings were seen as ultimately authoritative. As the saying goes, “So it has been said, so let it be done.” This is the same way in which Menelaos likely would have been treated as king of Mycenaean Sparta. As a result, he expected everyone to do everything he said. When he asked men to join him in battle, it was really nothing beyond a command, especially as these men had already sworn their allegiance to him. It is probable that Menelaos, brought up in some value system not unlike that of later Greeks to come, would have evaluated the potential war situation relative his personal and national fear, honor, and interest, which are the three fundamental points on which most wars, just or unjust, are in some way founded.11 Menelaos’ way of looking at these may very well have been fear of rejection on account of his lack of force in the situation; a desire to bring greater honor to himself and perhaps to his gods by a victory; and finally, a shrewd move of national and personal interest in returning his wife, the queen, to her rightful position beside him, and perhaps moreover, or at the least equally, to conquer Troy. This last issue, as the summation of the previous two points, would explain why Menelaos, in little time at all, had armed and prepared his fleet for battle. He was out to conquer and win glory.

Unfortunately, both Menelaos and Paris were wrong in their handling of the situation surrounding Helen’s abduction. Jus ad bellum has an aspect which the reader may recall as “last resort.” As it explains in its title, a war should only happen when all alternative modes of settlement have been properly pursued and demonstrated to be unavailable or denied in the situation. Yet neither party pursued peace. This automatically makes the Trojan War unjust, because all 17 criteria must be met, especially this one! If peace has not be sought out, then war is really just a pointless game that anyone can start at any time for any reason. This should bother  most people, and just the three points we have touched on from jus ad bellum alone ought to be reason enough to declare the Trojan War unjust. Still, there are seven more reasons we will consider explaining why the Trojan War was unjust.

Whether or not people liked it, the war was beginning. Menelaos had gathered his men, and had armed a thousand ships for battle. “A thousand ships carried the Greek host. They met at Aulis, a place of strong winds and dangerous tides, impossible to sail from as long as the north wind blew. And it kept on blowing, day after day.”12 The Greeks became worried. If their fleet could not get any further, then they might potentially starve and die, be lost from civilization, or simply not get to destroy Troy. Moving forward was crucial. As time went on, Agamemnon, Menelaos’ brother and a fellow Mycenaean king, decided that to be able to move forward more swiftly it was important to sacrifice his child to the gods. As a result, he deceived his daughter, making her believe that she was to be married if she met him at the island where he was. Instead, when she arrived, he sacrificed her. This caused all sorts of familial problems, but the winds did stop, and the Greeks sailed silently onward to Troy, with one life taken, and a thousand ships armed for battle. The war had begun.

In jus in bellum, one of the issues that is hardest to discern is that of proportionality in war. This is the issue of the Just War Theory which links jus ad bellum and jus in bellum, because usually at this point the war hasn’t started (jus ad bellum), but the force prepared is used in battle (jus in bellum).  How much military force is too much force is the question which proportionality tries to answer relative the size of the original problem. When considering the case of the preparatory actions of the Greeks to lay siege to Troy, one can’t help but wonder how just it really was. Helen was one woman, who, though taken by force, may not have been entirely unwilling to go with Paris in sin. To deceive and take the life of a girl entirely uninvolved in the issue, and additionally to have a thousand war ships taken to Troy, is probably too much to recompense for one living, though wronged (and perhaps wrong) person. In this, it becomes clear that even if the Greeks had followed all the rules of jus ad bellum, they still started the war out wrong. It seems the Greeks were hopelessly unjust.

Something many people do not know or recognize about the Trojan War is why it lasted so long. Thucydides, in his Peloponnesian War, provides a clue to this trivia. If, Thucydides says, the Greeks would have chosen to stick with the siege of Troy, they might have one the war very quickly. Since this is not what they did, Thucydides provides an account of what they did do. “Even after the victory they obtained on their arrival -- and victory there must have been, or the fortifications of the naval camp could never have been built -- there is no indication of their whole force having been employed; on the contrary, they seem to have turned to cultivation of the Chersonese and to piracy from want of supplies.”13 Yes, the Greeks were pirates!  According to Thucydides, the only reason they won after stopping their siege was because of this piracy.

The people have a right to be heard or left alone, and foreigners visiting a land on a mission of war have a responsibility to stay focused on their task without getting in the way of the lives of everyday civilians. Of course, these rules are harder to distinguish when at sea, but basic human rights still apply. Piracy violates such human rights, and it also goes against the policy of distinction in the Just War Theory. When in combat, soldiers need to be able to avoid hurting civilians in their warfare. At times, though, hurting civilians is not a matter of slashing an innocent person’s hand off with your sword: it can be an issue of stripping away one’s property, dignity, or basic rights. These are things which piracy can certainly be prone to do, and usually will do, leading to the conclusion that, yet again, the Greeks failed to observe the rules of the Just War Theory.

For nine long years, the war dragged out. Sometimes there was peace, sometimes there were battles. Yet, regardless of what happened, it was getting long. Everyone was tired of going through the same routines every day, and the war needed to be over. At last, after a long battle that suffered losses to both sides, Menelaos and Paris decided it was time to fight it out one on one. They were, after all, the two most involved characters at the beginning of the war, and even though others had taken command, the issue was still really over their relationship to Helen. So they did fight, and it appeared that Menelaos, Helen’s true husband, would get the victory. Somehow, though (Homer credits this to the gods), Paris made it through and something of a truce was formed. Another problem arose. Pandarus, a Trojan soldier, became persuaded of a need to shoot an arrow at Menelaos, which he did. Though he only injured the Spartan king a little, this rightly frustrated the Greeks, and so they brought the fighting back on.

In a just war, there are no reprisals. This means that when in the midst of war the first country violates the second country, and the latter seeks revenge, the war becomes unjust right at that moment (unless, of course, the party originally in the wrong corrects the violation). For a little while now, this essay has been focusing on the faults of the Greeks. Now, though, it is brought to light that the Trojans were every bit as much at fault as the Greeks were. The act of one person can have huge effects for a whole legion of people, which is something the Trojans now had to experience twice: first in the foolishness of Paris, and second in the foolishness of Pandarus. Due to human nature, people will tend to react harshly when an already difficult situation that was supposed to have been dealt with is suddenly brought up again. Revenge is the word one might use to describe such an act of harsh judgement, and revenge is what the Greeks took. Whether this was correct, is hard to say, but the problem is that the Trojans broke the newly formed peace treaty to continue fighting, making this an unjust war whether or not  one holds to the Just War Theory. So far, six points have been discussed regarding how the Trojan War was unjust:
The violation by both the Greeks and Trojans of comparative justice,
The violation by the Trojans of just cause,
The violation by both the Greeks and Trojans of last resort,
The violation of proportionality by the Greeks,
The violation of distinction by the Greeks, and
The violation by the Trojans of no reprisals.
Four issues remain to be considered, all of which are found in the final, and certainly the most famous episode in the whole of the Trojan War.

The tenth year had come. Knowing by an oracle that they could win this year, the Greeks pressed on, determined to conquer Troy forever. The two cities were not just in common dislike of one another -- they hated each other, and would do anything to win. Anything. Under this method of operation, the Greeks decided they had been through enough. At the end of yet another battle, they disappeared. Their camp remained, with a good amount of the soldiers still there. Yet all was silent for some time. It seemed to fit, too, as Hector had died recently, and under his leadership the Trojan army had held together. War was still present, but for the moment, it was a silent war. Then, one day, someone appeared at the gate of Troy, which had not been opened to anyone throughout the duration of the war. When the guard asked why he should open the gate for anyone, the man replied by directing the guard’s attention to the great object outside the gates: a huge horse made of wood. The man continued to explain that it was a peace offering and a gift for Athena. As he spoke, Greek ships began to sail away in the distance. This overjoyed the people of Troy, and so the gates of the city were at long last opened. The population of Troy was so delighted that all became drunk and slept soundly that night. As they slept, the ships of the Greeks turned around, and prepared themselves for battle. Inside the horse, many Greek men sat waiting for the cue. Then, at their signal, they quietly opened the trap door and jumped out, opening the gate for their fellow soldiers to come in. Then, the city was set ablaze, the men killed, and the women and children taken captive. The war was over.
Today, Troy is nothing more than a pit of ruins in Turkey, with some legends surrounding it. But even these meager ruins lead archaeologists and historians to believe that the Trojan war really may have happened -- and that its end was every bit as unjust as it appears. In the Just War Theory’s standard of jus post bellum, seven guidelines are stated by which a war should be ended.  All of these were completely ignored in the ending of the Trojan War. However, for the purposes of this essay, the four most prominently ignored shall be considered. First, just cause. Just cause demands that if a war is going to be ended, peaceful terms of agreement must be negotiated and agreed upon by both parties. While this was nearly made earlier in the war, the foolish act of Pandarus stopped it from happening, and so there was never a peacefully agreed end. It just ended. Second, discrimination. When a state goes to deal with the punishment of its own people, or of the other nation’s people, it needs to determine who is in the wrong, and who is innocent. The Greeks didn’t bother to think about this -- they went in to Troy and sacked it, along with all its innocent civilians, who didn’t want the war anyway. Third is the issue of proportionality. Probably the most noticeable of all the problems the Greeks had with applying jus post bellum, it is a self-explanatory ordeal. The whole city, on top of all the other issues the Greeks have had with proportion, just for the sake of one person, and to be the king of the hill, is not appropriate: it is appalling. The final way in which the Greeks clearly did not attempt to have a just war was in its rehabilitation of the people. Instead of seeking to help Troy get back to where it once was, Sparta and its allies came in, taking those they wanted, and killing the rest. So much for helping in the restoration of normality. Perspicuously, the Trojan War was highly unjust, unfavorable, and certainly unnecessary.

In this essay, the author has provided a history of and explanation for the Just War Theory, as composed by Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas; and consisting of jus ad bellum (just before the war), jus in bello (just in the war), and jus post bellum (just after the war). The author has used this explanation to provide ten sound reasons for the condemnation of the Trojan War on the rationale of its justice. These reasons are:
The violation by both the Greeks and Trojans of comparative justice in the abductions of each nation’s women,
The violation by the Trojans of just cause in Paris’ foolish abduction of Helen,
The violation by both the Greeks and Trojans of last resort in not seeking peace,
The violation of proportionality by the Greeks,
The violation of distinction by the Greeks, and
The violation by the Trojans of no reprisals.
7) The violation by the Greeks of just cause for termination in ending without a treaty or agreement of some sort,
8) The violation by the Greeks of distinction in sacking the entire city, rather than distinguishing between targets and civilians,
9) The violation by the Greeks of proportionality in using such a force as destroying Troy, and
The violation by the Greeks of rehabilitation in not given the remaining Trojans a chance.
Because of these facts, the author has argued that both the Greeks and Trojans were at fault, and, as a result, the Trojan War was a failure in justice. So this essay ends right as it began: with injustice. No one really knows what happened to Helen. Some say she was restored as queen of Sparta, others say she died in the fire, and still some say she escaped. In any situation, it is an unknown, as are the fates of the many Trojans who fell to the wrath of  Greece, all because of the Trojan failure to honor women. The injustice of the war, along with Troy and all its glory, is buried, and the fate of all who were there is sealed beyond the sea.

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